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The Gülen Movement: Between Turkey and International Exile 
Caroline Tee 
Introduction 
Since a failed attempt at a military coup on the night of 15 July 2016, the Gülen Movement (henceforth 
GM) has been forcibly exiled from its homeland of Turkey.1 The events of that night marked the final, 
explosive stage in Gülen’s transition from powerful establishment ally to Turkey’s most wanted 
criminal (Esen and Gumuscu 2017; Yavuz and Balcı 2018; Zarakol 2016). The Turkish government 
holds Fethullah Gülen directly responsible for masterminding the coup: the GM is referred to in Turkey 
today as FETÖ (Fethullahist Terrorist Organisation), and the unprecedented wave of arrests and state 
sector purges that have been witnessed since 2016 have ostensibly been aimed at its members. In reality, 
tens of thousands of people – many of whom have no connection to Gülen whatsoever - have lost their 
jobs, fled the country or are now languishing in prison. Those Gülenists who were able to escape have 
sought refuge overseas, many of them apparently in Western Europe and the United States of America 
(US), where the GM has an established presence. With its considerable financial assets in Turkey 
confiscated by the state, febrile anti-Gülenism pervading the public mood and President Erdoğan’s grip 
on power consolidated through an executive presidency, there is little prospect of the GM ever 
recovering its once powerful position in its homeland.  
Since 2016, the organisational contours of the GM have changed. Gülen continues to reside on his 
reclusive compound in Pennsylvania, US, where he has lived since 1999, and the efforts of the Turkish 
government to secure his extradition to face charges for masterminding the coup have so far failed. 
However, while Gülen and his inner circle of followers remain intact, the rest of the global GM has 
experienced serious rupture. Searching for a future outside Turkey, the GM has begun to regroup in 
nations including Germany, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the US, where for various reasons it is 
finding a relatively sympathetic reception (Lesage 2019; Watmough and Öztürk 2018).  
                                                          
1 Some parts of this chapter have previously been published in the author’s monograph, The Gülen Movement in 
Turkey: The Politics of Islam and Modernity (London: IB Tauris, 2016). 
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The victimization of the GM by a now-authoritarian regime in Turkey is ironic, for it is widely 
recognised that between the late 1990s and early 2010s, the movement was itself one of the foremost 
architects of that regime. There are numerous examples during that time of Gülenist involvement in 
political manoeuvring; what Watmough and Öztürk (2018) have referred to in the GM context as 
‘parapolitics’. In the AK Party’s first two terms in office, the GM acted as an unofficial ally to the 
government, sharing its conservative religious outlook and its desire to downgrade the power of the 
Kemalist establishment (Taş 2017; Yavuz 2018). Although not openly engaged in party politics, Gülen 
nonetheless steered a political course for the AK Party by mobilising his followers in the police service 
and the judiciary to conspire against senior secularist figures. The so-called Ergenekon, Balyoz and 
Poyrazköy trials saw 275 high ranking military officers, journalists and opposition politicians 
imprisoned on trumped up charges, and replaced with government sympathisers. They were 
subsequently exonerated and released, but the damage to Turkey’s secular institutional structure had 
already been done. Later on, the GM would turn its political manoeuvring against its former ally, most 
notably – although ultimately unsuccessfully - with corruption allegations against the Prime Minister 
launched in December 2013. Therefore, although the coup attempt in July 2016 was the first time the 
GM had been accused of violence (on the public record, Gülen is a pacifist), its track record of political 
meddling had already been common knowledge in Turkey for many years.    
While the GM has always attracted sceptics and detractors in Turkey, it has strategically recruited 
support for its activities overseas. It has focused particularly on centres of global power such as 
Washington D.C. Gülen’s residence in Pennsylvania has always been more than mere contingency: his 
followers have long been instructed to invest and settle in the US, a move that reflects the GM’s global 
ambition and strategic vision (Hendrick 2013; Tee 2016). That vision developed pragmatically in a 
post-9/11 era, when the appetite for representations of ‘moderate’ Islam amongst western audiences and 
policy makers has been considerable. With its focus on secular education and inter-faith dialogue, its 
engagement in free market entrepreneurship, and its public support for political democracy, the GM has 
provided an attractive foil to the violent jihadi extremism emerging from other parts of the Muslim 
Middle East.  
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International endorsements of the GM were especially common during its heyday, between 2002-2012, 
when optimism about the Turkey’s future under the AKP government was high. Turkey was ascribed 
then with the potential to serve as a ‘model’ of Islam successfully co-existing with modern, liberal 
democracy. The GM played an important part in the construction of that image. Academics were 
amongst those openly expressing their admiration and support for Gülen (Ebaugh 2009; Pandya and 
Gallagher 2012; Weller and Yılmaz 2012), and a body of largely uncritical pro-GM literature emerged, 
some of which was written and published by the GM itself from its publishing houses in New Jersey, 
US. More recently, and particularly since 2016, scholarship on the GM has taken a notably more critical 
turn. Currently, there are perhaps two major topics that occupy scholarly attention on the GM: the first 
of these concerns the contradictions between the GM’s public image and international presence, and its 
‘parapolitical’ activities in Turkey, which – having been ignored by supporters for decades - are now 
beyond question; the second concerns the movement’s future as a diaspora movement in the wake of 
2016.  
The aim of this chapter is to offer an introductory overview of the ideas, organizational structure and 
activities of the GM, an explanation for its emergence and rapid rise to power and influence in late 
twentieth and early twenty-first century Turkey, and an analysis of the souring of its relationship with 
the AK Party and its dramatic fall from grace. It will conclude with a brief analysis of the current state 
of the field in GM studies in light of the failed coup, and the new directions that the GM now faces as 
a movement seeking to regroup in exile.  
 
Fethullah Gülen and the Origins of the GM  
Fethullah Gülen was born in the village of Korucuk, Erzurum in 1938 (Mercan 2008: 34-35). His origins 
in Erzurum help to explain his distinctive interpretation of Islam and the Turkish nationalist tenor of 
the GM (Yavuz 2013:25-46). Erzurum is a socially conservative province known for its pious 
population, located high on the central Anatolian plateau, within a few hours’ drive of Turkey’s eastern 
frontiers with Iran, Armenia and Georgia. Erzurum is therefore a strategic city and has a long military 
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history, dictated in large part by its frontier position in both Ottoman and Republican eras. Military 
skirmishes with neighbouring powers have been a feature of life in Erzurum for centuries, and have 
contributed to the development of a regional identity built on strong national as well as Muslim religious 
sentiment.   
Typical of the time and place in which he was born, Gülen’s childhood in the 1940s and 1950s was 
characterised by rural, Turkish Sunni Muslim practices and ways of learning. He attended the first four 
years of primary school, but thereafter had a traditional religious education in local Sufi tekkes. In the 
tekkes, Gulen received religious instruction from sheikhs of the Naqshbandi Order (Weismann 2007), 
of which his father was a member, as well as from the Qadiri Order. On leaving the tekke, Gülen 
continued to pursue his study of Sufism under the guidance of various local sheikhs in Erzurum, where 
he also embarked on the formal study of Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh). 
While he was still a young man, Gülen became familiar with the teachings of Said Nursi, the Kurdish-
Turkish Islamic thinker whose intellectual tradition he went on to follow (Abu Rabi 2003; Mardin 1989; 
Vahide 2005). Nursi (1877-1960) was a paradigmatic Turkish modernist thinker who authored the 
Risale-i Nur (Epistle of Light). The principle tenet of Nursi’s teachings is his vision of a revitalisation 
of Turkish religious culture, which he saw to be under threat from the rise of scientific scepticism and 
secularisation in the modern age (Abu Rabi 2008; Turner 2008). He envisaged this religious revival 
taking place, not through the medium of political activism or violent revolution, but rather through a 
principle that he defined as ‘positive action’ (müspet hareket). This principle allowed for pious believers 
to engage and contribute peaceably to society at large in all of its constituent parts, and through it Nursi 
foresaw an effective way of reintroducing Islamic mores back into the public sphere with the ultimate 
aim of reinstating Islam as the guiding principle of Turkish society. Nursian principles and the core 
intellectual themes from the Risale are clearly visible in Gülen’s own published works: indeed, 
members of the GM have appealed to the movement’s pacifist Nursi-inspired ideology, albeit to a 
sometimes sceptical audience, when speaking in defence of Gülen in the post-coup era.2  
                                                          
2 For example, see Section 3 of the parliamentary report, ‘UK’s Relations with Turkey’ available at 





At the age of eighteen, Gülen passed the exam to become a state-appointed imam, and was soon sent to 
the western coastal city of Izmir, where he assumed the directorship of a Qur’anic school attached to 
the Kestanepazarı mosque in the city centre. It was in Izmir in the late 1960s that Gülen began to attract 
a following, and the GM had its genesis.   
As well as preaching regularly at the Kestanepazarı mosque, Gülen began to visit local coffee-houses 
to preach and his message started to reach a wider demographic than the already religiously-observant 
sectors of the community. By reaching out beyond the traditional catchment of pious individuals, Gülen 
sought to take his message of moral and spiritual reform to a broader group of listeners in the public 
sphere. The teachings of Said Nursi constituted the foundations of his message, but, significantly, 
Gülen’s presentation of those teachings focused on their practical enactment in the local context of 
1960s Izmir. He set out to show his early audience of students, small business owners and tradespeople 
how religious piety might complement, rather than compromise, their professional activities and 
successfully be enacted in their various spheres of worldly influence.   
A major factor behind Gülen’s success of these early years was his charismatic oratorical style, which 
he continued to manifest until 2016 through the publication of his sermons online. His use of a rather 
archaic Turkish is quite distinctive, and he has an extremely emotional style of delivery which often 
results in him being overcome and crying while preaching. This tendency to display emotion, for which 
he is well-known, is mocked by detractors but greatly admired by his followers, amongst whom it is 
interpreted as a sign of sincerity and spiritual depth.  
 
Sufi Motifs in Gülenist Thought 
Gülen is a social activist and in some senses an entrepreneur, but primarily he is a teacher and preacher 
of Islam. His interpretation of the Sunni tradition is distinctive in a number of ways. First, it is strongly 
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influenced by the mystical conceits of Anatolian Sufism (Sarıtoprak in Yavuz and Esposito 2003: 156-
169). He has written four books which address Sufi themes directly (Gülen 2011), although the same 
Sufi idiom pervades all of his writings and sermons on other topics. This is an area of Gülen’s work in 
which he diverges somewhat from the precedent set by Said Nursi. The heavy emphasis on Sufi themes 
and especially on the Sufic concept of love is particular to Gülen and not something that is developed 
in the same way in Nursi’s Risale. 
Gülen’s followers point out, however, that his reliance on mystical themes and ideas in order to 
communicate with his readers is entirely consistent with the Turkish cultural and religious context from 
which he emerged. Sufism has been a central component of the Islam practiced in Anatolia since 
Ottoman times, when tarikat activity characterised every level of society for hundreds of years. The 
official abolition of the tarikats in the 1920s may have dramatically reduced their presence in public 
life, but the language and motifs of Sufism have continued to occupy a central place in Turkish Muslim 
consciousness, be it through familiarity with the folk poetry of Yunus Emre or the learned wisdom of 
Mevlana Rumi.   
It is therefore within this framework of a broadly familiar Sufi cultural tradition that Gülen 
communicates. Central to Sufi thought is the concept of love; love for God and desire, ultimately, to be 
united with him. Love is also a central motif in Gülen’s theology: 
Love is the most essential element of every being, and it is the most radiant light, and it is the greatest power; able 
to resist and overcome all else. Love elevates every soul that absorbs it, and prepares those souls for the journey 
to eternity. Souls that have been able to make contact with eternity through love exert themselves to inspire in all 
other souls what they have derived from eternity. They dedicate their lives to this sacred duty, a duty for the sake 
of which they endure every kind of hardship to the very end, and just as they pronounce ‘love’ with their last 
breath, they will also breathe ‘love’ while being raised on the Day of Judgment. (Gülen 2006:1) 
Through the prism of this Sufic interpretation of love, Gülen articulates his vision for the betterment of 
humanity. This is a key concern that underpins his social and religious teachings, and which has become 
gradually more expansive and ambitious over the past fifty years of his life and career. Love of God 
plays a crucial role in Gülen’s thought, and love of others for the sake of God is also ascribed with great 
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importance. Altruism, which is highly praised, is therefore rooted by Gülen in Islamic spirituality and 
defined as, “devoting oneself to the lives of others in complete forgetfulness of all concerns of one's 
own [;] it is self-annihilation in the interests of others”.3  
While Gülen draws frequently on Sufi-inspired ideas, and often references poetry from the mystical 
canon to elaborate his teachings, he is clear to distance himself from the organised nature of Sufism, 
namely its tarikat structure. His followers are also often at pains to point out that the movement is not 
a Sufi order, appealing to two points of evidence: first, the absence in the Gülen Movement of the ritual 
religious practice which is a central element of the Sufi orders; and second, the lack of initiation rites 
or clear demarcation of membership or belonging. Indeed, Gülen’s vision far exceeds the scope of a 
Sufi tarikat. Rather than being introspective in the traditional way it is outward-looking and 
preoccupied with engagement of pious Muslims with the world around them rather than esoteric 
seclusion from it.4 
The trope of love for God and humankind in Gulenist thought provides the context for his articulation 
of Said Nursi’s doctrine of positive action (müspet hareket). This concept provides the essential 
framework for Gülen’s understanding of how Islamic faith might best be enacted in the modern age, 
and is based on the moral responsibility of believers to make a positive contribution to society in the 
service of Islam. The ultimate aim of positive action is the restoration of religious values to modern 
society, which is perceived in the Nursian (and Gülenist) imaginary to be under threat from 
secularisation and accompanying forces hostile to religion. Unlike other modern Muslim revival 
ideologies, however, which have espoused political activism and even violent revolution, positive 
action is a peaceful, apolitical and non-confrontational endeavour. It therefore requires of believers that 
they contribute to the preservation of public order and stability rather than directly challenge the status 
                                                          
3 M. Fethullah Gülen. Key Concepts in the Practice of Sufism: Emerald Hills of the Heart Vol. 2. “I’thar”. 
Available at http://en.fgulen.com/sufism-2/2365-ithar-altruism 
4 Sufi tarikats throughout history have sustained a sometimes complex relationship with wider society, and 
many of them have been socially active and engaged. What distinguishes them from the Gülen Movement is, 
however, their rootedness in esoteric ritual practice. 
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quo. The principle of positive action is explained in the following terms by a movement insider in 
Turkey: 
In every society you might find radical challenge and violent movements – in the USA, Africa, Russia, 
everywhere… But, speaking about this movement, it is not anti-systemic. It is not a protest to the existing norms, 
authorities, state, tradition – and I am talking about every country in which it is present. In every decade of its 
maybe four-decade lifespan it has been non-contentious, non-violent. This is müspet hareket, in Hocaefendi’s 
terminology.5 
Scholars and commentators in the post-coup era have recognized the obvious dissonance between the 
GM’s long-time public commitment to peaceful social activism, and the allegations of its involvement 
in the bloody events of 15 July 2016 (Hendrick in Yavuz and Balcı 2017).   
 
Structure and Organisation: Defining the Gülen Movement 
The Gülen Movement defies easy categorisation, and points of comparison with other religious 
organisations or ideologies are hard to find. The movement itself is ambivalent about labelling itself, 
and tends to reject the suggestion that it is an organised movement (hareket) at all. Insiders talk instead 
of the movement as ‘Hizmet’, which literally means ‘service’ and refers, in this usage, to the application 
of the abstract, philosophical concept that they say lies at the heart of Gülen’s vision of a better world. 
The Islamic rationale for this concept is sometimes made explicit and sometimes not.  
Gülen’s own role within the movement is also the subject of considerable ambiguity. He is presented, 
not as the head of an organised, hierarchical structure, but rather as an ‘inspiration’ to a loose network 
of altruistic volunteers who are united only by their commitment to universal principles of civic and 
humanitarian service. Insiders typically play down their connections with one another, and a common 
assertion is that there is no ‘organic connection’ (organik bağlantı), by which is meant an official tie, 
between them.  
                                                          
5 Author’s interview in English with a senior management figure at Gazeteciler ve Yazarlar Vakfı (Journalists 
and Writers Foundation) in Istanbul, March 2013. 
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Joshua Hendrick has called this tendency towards opaqueness about the movement’s operational 
structure “strategic ambiguity”, and links it to its emergence in late-twentieth century Turkey when 
limitations were in place on public religious identities (Hendrick 2013). It has attracted scepticism 
amongst detractors, who find it hard to countenance the spread of institutions and initiatives all around 
the world which bear the hallmark of Gülen and yet recognise no central organisational structure and 
have no official affiliation. These sceptics have tended also to infer an Islamist agenda at the 
movement’s core, and found it unconvincing that its interests and aspirations lie purely in the realm of 
civil society. In this vein, in Turkey it is common for unsympathetic outsiders to use the 
term cemaat (religious community) to refer to the movement, in a somewhat pejorative sense. The 
term cemaat has connotations of subversion in that it refers to religious groups that are still legally 
banned under the 1925 law which forcibly closed the Sufi tarikats. Movement insiders argue that it is 
an inappropriate label, partly because of its association with religious ritual activity, which is not a 
feature of the movement, and partly because of its closed, sectarian implications, which Gülenist actors 
invariably seek to play down.     
The ambiguity surrounding the movement and the identities of its affiliates has lessened to some extent 
since the coup attempt of 2016. Movement insiders have become rather less insistent on stating publicly 
that the movement is not, in fact, a movement at all and have discarded some of their earlier guarded 
reserve on this subject. They still, however, refer to Hizmet rather than using the term Gülen Movement, 
which is largely an appellation used in external, English-language sources. Insiders fluent in English 
might talk comfortably of ‘the movement’ in interviews in that language, reflecting their familiarity 
with the growing discourse and body of literature on Gülen in the West, but in Turkish they almost 
always revert back to simply ‘Hizmet’.    
 
Degrees of Affiliation: Core Affiliates 
It is impossible to say precisely how many individuals are, or have been, involved in the Gülen 
Movement, although an extremely approximate estimation might put the number of close affiliates of 
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Gülen in Turkey somewhere between 500,000 and 2 million people in the pre-2016 era. This ambiguity 
is partly because there is no official criteria for belonging; there are no initiation rites and no clear 
membership status. It is also partly because individuals may be involved in different capacities and with 
greatly differing degrees of commitment. The movement is characterised by a multi-tiered nexus of 
engagement with three degrees of involvement. At the heart of the movement is a group who are 
dedicated and loyal followers of Gülen, some of whom may reside with him and receive religious 
instruction on his ranch in Pennsylvania, but the majority of whom live elsewhere. These individuals 
are committed disciples and keen consumers of Gülen’s teachings either through personal contact or 
from a distance through print and digital media. They usually work or study in a Gülenist institution of 
some kind, and are fully dedicated in every aspect of their lives to the furtherance of the movement’s 
vision. These individuals display Muslim piety through their lifestyle, personal conduct and dress. 
Women adopt the modest, tesettür style of clothing that is favoured by conservative, mainly urban 
women across Turkey, and men often favour smart suits and ties. Inter-personal conduct is regulated by 
strict codes of Islamic morality, and contact with the opposite sex is usually limited to verbal greetings 
and minimal interaction.  
Individuals within this core group of movement affiliates express a strong commitment to the principle 
of dialogue and are consequently generally very open to engagement and conversation with outsiders. 
The public persona that is projected is extremely affable and helpful. The values of tolerance, hospitality 
and hard work which are lauded in the work of Gülen are physically embodied by this core group, who 
strive to apply those teachings on a practical level in their daily lives. The motivation for living in this 
way is described by Zehra,6 a committed follower of Gülen who was a teacher at a (now closed) Gülen 
school in Turkey in 2013: 
You’re not only Muslim when you’re praying, you’re Muslim when you’re living – twenty-four hours a day. 
That’s why I love him (Fethullah Gülen) so much, and that’s why I’m working here in this school. Because it’s 
                                                          
6 Not her real name.  
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something related to a sociable life, you know? I want to do something for this society. That’s why I’m working 
here. 
This core group of committed individuals like Zehra is surrounded in more peripheral roles by a 
contingent who might be best described as sympathizers (onaylayanlar), who are active yet more casual 
supporters of the Gülenist vision and the movement’s activities. This group includes, significantly, 
businessmen of a pious disposition who lend critical financial support to the movement’s projects. It 
also includes individuals who might attend, either regularly or sporadically, the events known 
as sohbet (lit: ‘conversation’) at which the books and sermons of Fethullah Gülen are studied and 
expounded by followers in conjunction with the Risale of Said Nursi and the Qur’an.7  
The largest and most peripheral stratum of participation in the broad Gülenist project is occupied by 
those who consume the products and services offered by Gülenist institutions, and who may or may not 
be cognizant of the connection of those products and services to the movement. These might include 
readers and viewers of the various print, digital and visual media channels run by the movement, clients 
in the banking and insurance sector, patients in Gülen-run medical facilities, and parents of children 
studying at Gülen schools. Within Turkey, when the GM was still operational there, it is most likely 
that these consumers were aware to some extent of the Gülenist origins of these products, but outside 
Turkey it is possible that these parents and consumers are not necessarily aware of the existence of 
Fethullah Gülen or such a thing as the Gülen Movement at all.  
 
Early Expansion of the GM 
In the 1970s, Gülen’s fledgling group of followers began to establish a presence outside Izmir, and 
opened further summer camps as well as dormitories and after-school revision centres (dershane) in 
other Turkish cities. In the 1980s, changing circumstances in domestic politics and their impact on 
Turkish society at large had an important effect on the development and growth of the young movement. 
                                                          
7 The sohbet tradition is not unique to the Gülen Movement, but is practiced in many Islamic groups in Turkey 




Its activities expanded dramatically during this decade following the military coup of 1980 and the new 
constitution of 1982, events which ushered in an era of economic liberalisation under the leadership of 
Prime Minister Turgut Özal.  
The tenor of Turkish society shifted markedly in the 1980s and the previously hegemonic authority of 
the self-consciously secular state began to concede to counter-hegemonic voices, namely those speaking 
for Islam (Lord 2018; Mango 2004; Zurcher 2004). This followed a decade of severe unrest and social 
polarization in the 1970s, during which violent clashes between right and left-wing factions were 
common and the loss of life had been considerable. The military coup of 1980, under the leadership of 
General (subsequently, President) Kenan Evren, sought to bring an end to this chaotic situation and did 
so by ushering in an intellectual doctrine called the ‘Turkish-Islamic synthesis’. Conscious at the time 
of internal currents of leftist dissent exacerbated by the keenly-felt threat of Soviet communism on 
Turkey’s near borders, the ‘Turkish-Islamic synthesis’ paved the way for Islam to re-emerge in the 
public sphere, and to be recognised as the key unifying feature of the Turkish nation. The size and scope 
of the Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı), was increased during this period 
accordingly, and religious themes began to re-emerge in various areas of national life. 
During this decade, therefore, followers of Gülen benefitted from new social as well as economic 
conditions that were highly favourable to the flourishing of their schooling project. Private ‘Gülen 
schools’ were established in cities all over Turkey during this decade, including Yamanlar Koleji in 
Izmir, Samanyolu Koleji in Ankara and Fatih Koleji in Istanbul, schools which were considered the 
most prestigious and academically-successful until their forced closures – along with hundreds of other 
Gülen schools in Turkey - in 2016.  
Followers of Gülen were also active in the 1980s in other fields. It was during this decade that they 
began to invest in business as well as media, interests which later represented a significant share of the 
movement’s total financial and cultural assets.8 In the 1990s, the group started to branch out overseas, 
                                                          
8 The movement’s major media corporation was Feza Gazetecilik (Feza Media Group), which owned the 
national daily newspaper Zaman and its English-language counterpart, Today’s Zaman. Işık Sigorta was an 
insurance firm run by movement affiliates, and the Islamic lender Bank Asya was a Gülenist institution. All of 
these ventures are now closed. 
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primarily in the field of education but also in these other constituent areas. The first countries that the 
movement expanded into were the newly-independent states of Central Asia, where Gülen’s followers 
capitalised on the emergence of new markets following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 
(Özdalga 2007; Turam 2003). They did so to some extent in collaboration with the Turkish state which, 
under the prime ministerships of Özal and later Tansu Çiller, was itself seeking to build on the cultural 
ties between Turkey and the Central Asian peoples and to establish itself with a diplomatic and trading 
presence in that part of the world. The movement grew rapidly internationally during this time, and by 
the end of the 1990s, it had schools and business interests in approximately eighty countries around the 
world. 
During the 1980s and 1990s, Gülen attracted support from a new generation of pious Anatolian 
businessmen who established themselves during this period as successful manufacturers and exporters. 
Known colloquially as the ‘Anatolian Tigers’, they emerged from religiously and socially conservative, 
medium-size towns such as Kayseri, Adana and Afyonkarahisar. These pious entrepreneurs 
successfully capitalised on newly liberal conditions instigated after the 1980 coup, and joined a Turkish 
economic elite that had previously been largely off-limits to religiously-minded people in the Anatolian 
hinterland.  
This new phenomenon in Turkish business and industry was, in turn, institutionalised. In 1971, 
TÜSIAD (Turkish Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s Association), a staunchly secularist business 
confederation dedicated to the principles of Kemalism, had been established by members of Turkey’s 
old industrial class. In 1990, MÜSIAD (Independent Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s Association) 
was founded by a new group of pious Turkish businessmen. It served as a religiously-minded alternative 
to TÜSIAD and has focused particularly on cultivating closer trade links with the Muslim countries of 
the Persian Gulf and the wider Middle East. Industrialists who were followers of Gülen later established 
their own Gülenist collective known as TUSKON (Confederation of Businessmen and Industrialists in 
Turkey) in 2005. The Gülenists thus separated from MÜSIAD, and TUSKON became a transnational 
organisational umbrella under which the businesses affiliated with the Gülen Movement came together 




Genesis and Growth of a Movement in Science Education 
Science focused education has been the principal activity of the GM since its inception. In the late 
1960s, Gülen and a burgeoning group of followers who were attracted to his teachings started to 
organise summer revision camps in Izmir for local high school and university students. These early 
camps, which were the prototype for the global network of private schools that the Gülen Movement 
went on to operate, were inspired by Gülen’s vision for the education of a ‘golden generation’ (altın 
nesil) equally well versed in modern science as in knowledge of Islam and Islamic ethics (Agai 2002; 
Tee and Shankland 2014, Tee 2016). 
This distinctive educational vision can be traced back to the thought of Said Nursi, who attempted in 
his own lifetime to establish a university teaching both the secular and the religious sciences in the 
eastern city of Van. This plan encountered opposition from the state and was never realised, but the 
philosophical seed for the conception of such a project is contained within the pages of the Risale. Gülen 
articulated this educational vision in the following way: 
As stated by Bediüzzaman, there is an understanding of education that sees the 
illumination of the mind in science and knowledge, and the light of the heart in faith 
and virtue. This understanding, which makes the student soar in the skies of humanity 
with these two wings and seek God’s approval through service to others, has many 
things to offer. It rescues science from materialism, from being a factor that is as 
harmful as it is beneficial from both material and spiritual perspectives, and from 
being a lethal weapon. Such an understanding, in Einstein’s words, will not allow 
religion to remain crippled. Nor will it allow religion to be perceived as cut off from 
intelligence, life, and scientific truth and as a fanatical institution that builds walls 
between individuals and nations. (Ünal and Williams 1999: 318) 
The Izmir camps were initially all-male and were characterised by a culture of strict discipline. The 
inculcation of Islamic ethics is a crucial component within Gülen’s educational vision, and typically 
takes place through the lived example of Gülenist educators and their demonstration of meritorious 
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ethical practices (Vicini 2013). In Gülenist pedagogy, the role of the teacher is twofold: the transmission 
of scientific knowledge is one aspect of the teaching vocation, but of equal import is the informal 
mentoring of students in Islamic ethics and morality. The latter endeavour is not limited to the classroom 
setting but extends to extra-curricular time and space where close personal relationships are formed 
between teachers and students, and – crucially - where new recruits to the GM are cultivated.  
The importance of teachers in the Gülenist project cannot be overstated. These individuals are devoted 
followers of Gülen, who are deeply committed to their leader, their religion, and the project of hizmet 
(service), which is the central concept in Gülenist ideology. According to Gülen, working as a teacher 
in a secular school context, or indeed as an administrator in one of the GM’s dialogue or media 
organisations, is a manifestation of religious service and carries with it the promise of reward (sevap) 
in the afterlife. This reformulated theology of religious duty underpins the entire GM project, and 
explains the extraordinary hard work and commitment of the individuals employed at Gülen schools, 
and, to some extent, the success of the GM educational project. It is entirely possible – indeed likely – 
that this cohort of loyal supporters have had no knowledge of, or involvement in, the GM’s political 
ambitions. The organisation is strictly hierarchical in structure, with chains of command stretching from 
Gülen down through a senior management cohort and beyond; to national, regional and local level 
leaders known as abis (lit. ‘big brother’) and ablas (‘big sister’) (Hendrick 2013; Watmough and Öztürk 
2018). Gülen and his most senior circle of acolytes take decisions regarding national and international 
strategy, and those further down the chains of transmission – the rank and file of loyal GM workers - 
are not necessarily party to them.  
 
Gülen’s Move to the US and Globalisation of the Movement 
Partly as a culmination of domestic political shifts in the 1980s, the 1990s saw the rise to power in 
Turkey of the Islamist Welfare Party (Refah Partisi), the precursor to the AK Party, which was in office 
between 1996 and 1997 under the leadership of Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan (White 2002). 
Erbakan and his government left office after a so-called ‘postmodern coup’ in 1997, which aimed to 
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restore Turkey’s constitutionally secular principles to the national order. Gülen had not openly lent his 
support to the Welfare Party, choosing to retain his distance from the political Islamism of Erbakan’s 
group in much the same way that Nursi had kept his distance from Adnan Menderes and the Democrat 
Party (Demokrat Partisi) in the 1950s.9 However, in the tense atmosphere of the anti-Islamist period 
which followed the 1997 coup, Gülen was also implicated. He was wanted by the authorities for his 
involvement in what were perceived as anti-secular activities of his own, and a warrant was issued for 
his arrest. In 1999, Gülen left Turkey for America. Later on, during the heyday of his unofficial alliance 
with the AKP government, the charges against him were lifted, yet he chose not to return, always 
enigmatically citing ‘poor health’ as his reason for preferring to remain in the US.  
The decade following Gülen’s move to America witnessed the movement’s fuller global expansion, as 
well as the rapid development of its activities in the USA itself. While Turkey remained central, the 
movement now managed a sizeable portfolio of interests in the USA including a number of major 
dialogue platforms (namely, the Rumi Forum in Washington D.C. and the Gülen Institute in Houston) 
and somewhere in the region of 150 charter schools (Hendrick 2013). Between 2000 and 2013, it also 
expanded its global activities to an estimated 160 countries all around the world, ranging from Europe 
(Balcı 2018; Ozzano 2018; van Bruinessen 2014) to South America (Dumovich 2018), and Sub-Saharan 
Africa to South East Asia (Dohrn 2014; Saleem and Osman 2019) where it has run a global network of 
schools, medical facilities, dialogue platforms and business interests. Since the coup attempt, the 
Turkish government has made sustained attempts to force the closure of GM schools and businesses 
overseas. For the most part, it has been successful in those countries where Turkey wields cultural 
and/or economic influence (Azerbaijan was amongst the first to close all GM institutions, some of which 
have subsequently been taken over by the state), but generally less so elsewhere. The GM has mostly 
retained its freedom to operate in Western nations, which tend to be immune to Erdoğan’s appeals for 
the GM to be punished and expelled.  
                                                          
9 The political Islamist ideology of the Welfare Party inspired the development of Milli Görüş, a major Turkish 
diaspora movement quite distinctive from the global Gülen Movement, espousing a political vision for the 




The Rise and Fall of the GM-AK Party Alliance  
The context for the GM’s period of prosperity and wealth accumulation in the early 2000s was an 
unofficial alliance that it established with the AKP government. Following its landslide electoral victory 
in 2002, the AK Party was able to command a single-party majority in the Turkish Parliament for the 
first time since 1983. Gülen commanded his followers to vote for the AK Party, but their numbers were 
not enough to significantly impact its electoral successes: the GM is an elitist rather than a grassroots 
organization, and its primary source of usefulness to the AK Party did not rest in the numbers of voters 
it attracted. Rather, sharing a common commitment to religious conservatism and a desire to weaken 
the power of the Kemalist establishment, the GM was an essential ally to the government because it 
commanded a loyal support base scattered throughout the civil service, the police force and the 
judiciary. The AK Party was therefore able to circumvent the separation of powers between the 
legislature, the executive and the judiciary by calling on Gülenist allies for help. The clearest example 
of this was in the Ergenekon, Balyoz and Poyrazköy trials beginning in 2008, when Gülenist prosecutors 
brought falsified charges against over a hundred key secularists and government detractors.  
While the falsification of evidence which underpinned these trials is now acknowledged, it was, 
remarkably, almost entirely unquestioned at the time (an exception being Jenkins 2009). The trials 
commanded broad support, not only from a conservative religious constituency but also from the 
nation’s secular intellectuals, most of whom endorsed the narrative that calling the army generals to 
account, and reining in the political power of the military, paved the way for a new era of fuller 
democratization in Turkey. Despite the dubious validity of the evidence presented, a popular narrative 
argued that by seeking to downgrade the guardianship of the armed forces over the secular state, Turkey 
was coming into line with European Union requirements surrounding freedom of expression and the 
conditions associated with liberal democracy. In turn, there was much support in Europe and the US for 
these moves to apparently liberalize the Turkish political landscape. A Brookings Institution briefing 
from April 2012, for example, declared that “the AKP heralds democracy”, and described its potential 
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(widely discussed at the time) to serve as a successful model to Arab nations in the wake of the regional 
uprisings (Taşpınar 2012).  
During the AKP’s  second term in office, tensions began to appear in public between Prime Minister 
Erdoğan and Fethullah Gülen. These tensions did not manifest themselves in the parliamentary context, 
for there were only very few Gülenists in cabinet positions. Rather, as tensions rose, they became 
apparent in broader power-struggles, as the movement exerted its considerable influence within the 
police force and the judiciary.  
One of the earliest sources of conflict between the two men, and the subject of their first public 
disagreement, was in the realm of international affairs and concerned Turkey’s relationship with Israel. 
Throughout the twentieth century, Turkey had been a rare regional ally of Israel and relations between 
the two countries had been generally strong. Since Prime Minister Erdoğan’s rise to power this 
relationship has deteriorated severely. Various diplomatic spats between the two countries have 
escalated rapidly, fuelled in part by an ideologically-driven anti-Israeli rhetoric from the Prime Minister 
himself. The failure of diplomatic relations between Turkey and Israel has been accompanied by a surge 
in anti-Israeli sentiment in the general public. When Erdoğan publically stormed out of a debate on 
Gaza with Israeli President Shimon Peres at the Davos World Economic Forum in 2009, he was greeted 
as a returning hero on his arrival in Turkey, with cheering crowds waiting for him at the airport.  
Gülen’s stance on Israel is markedly different from Erdoğan’s, and is shaped by his support for 
American neo-liberal values. The Prime Minister’s public rhetoric against Israel sat uneasily with 
Gülen, and while he did not speak out after the Davos affair he did intervene in the Mavi Marmara 
incident of the following year. This incident, in which nine Turkish activists on a humanitarian flotilla 
were killed at sea by Israeli soldiers in their attempt to break the blockade on Gaza, led to the expulsion 
of the Israeli ambassador from Ankara and the suspension of diplomatic relations between the two 
countries. Gülen spoke out publically, suggesting that the confrontational approach of the activists had 
been misplaced and that the pursuit of a diplomatic path would have been preferable, both before the 
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crisis and in its aftermath.10 His position brought him into direct conflict with the Prime Minister and 
with public opinion more widely, and although there was only muted public response to an interview 
that he gave, it was a sign of further trouble to come. 
The major deterioration in AKP-Gülenist relations came nearly two years later in February 2012, when 
Gülenist prosecuters sought the arrrest of Hakan Fidan, the head of Turkey’s National Intelligence 
Organisation (Millî İstihbarat Teşkilatı, MIT) and a close personal ally of Erdoğan. Fidan was engaged 
at the time in secret, high level talks with Abdullah Öcalan, the highly-controversial leader of the 
Kurdish PKK who is serving a life prison sentence. The Kurdish issue is a subject on which the 
movement had differed ideologically from the AKP: being strongly informed by Turkish nationalist 
ideology, the movement was not a keen supporter of the government’s tentative rapprochement with 
Kurdish separatists. Erdoğan was able to stop Fidan’s arrest by issuing emergency legislation the 
following day, but the movement’s attack on such a high-level AKP ally was perceived as a declaration 
of open warfare. 
It was not long until the government hit back. In October of the same year, the Prime Minister 
announced his intention to forcibly close down the nation’s dershane network, an area in which 
followers of Gülen were heavily invested.11 According to this new plan, dershanes across the country 
were to be turned into private schools, ostensibly because the government no longer wished to tolerate 
a parallel system of education provision. The inefficiencies and inequalities of the dershane system 
were not in doubt, but the sudden anouncement of their impending closure came as a shock to many. 
The Gülen Movement was amongst the foremost providers of dershane education in Turkey; large 
national franchises such as FEM, as well as innumerable smaller operations, provided a valuable source 
of income to the movement, and also acted as its primary recruitment ground. In threatening to close 
them down, the AKP government knew that it was targetting one of the major arteries of the 
                                                          
10 “Fethullah Gülen Mavi Marmara Baskını Hakkinda Görüşleri”, available at 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=th4OF_2ddBo (Accessed 13 April 2019). 
11 “Dersaneler Kapanacak”, Yeni Asır (6 October 2012). At 
https://www.yeniasir.com.tr/politika/2012/10/07/dershaneler-kapanacak (Accessed 17 April 2019). 
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movement’s social and economic power. Gülen recognised the severity of the threat and offered to 
voluntarily turn the movement’s dershanes over to state control, but the offer was rejected.  
Against this backdrop of mounting tension, relations between the two groups failed irretrievably in 
2013. In May and June of that year, the Gezi Park riots dominated the national news. Violent protests 
spread from a park in central Istanbul to Ankara, Izmir and many other major cities across Turkey. The 
riots began as a small-scale, environmental protest but soon became a national movement focused on 
opposition to Prime Minister Erdoğan. Erdoğan responded by ordering a harsh police crackdown, which 
resulted in multiple deaths and many serious injuries. It also triggered widespread criticism of his 
handling of the crisis in the international media (Letsch 2013).  
The protesters were drawn from a wide range of social and religious backgrounds, including a group 
calling itself ‘Anti-Capitalist Muslims’, but were dominated by individuals of a secular-leaning, 
educated and urban background. These are not the people of Gülen’s core constituency, and he voiced 
his criticism of the protesters, declaring that their actions were indicative of ‘a generation of moral and 
spiritual decay’.12 Gülen was also, however, openly critical of the AKP’s response to the situation and 
publically condemned its excessive use of force to quash the riots. He was not alone in voicing criticism 
of Erdoğan’s heavy-handed approach – indeed, various senior members of the AKP did as well, namely 
incumbent president Abdullah Gül and deputy Prime Minister Bülent Arınç. Nonetheless, Gülen’s 
public criticism of the then-Prime Minister did nothing to improve already deteriortating relations 
between the two men. 
Escalation of the mounting power-struggle between Gülen and his followers and Erdogan’s AKP came 
with the corruption scandal that erupted on 17 December 2013. The Gülenists played their best hand in 
revealing material that appeared to indicate endemic corruption within the AKP and embezzlement of 
public funds on a shocking scale. It was a bold move. The recordings that were leaked a few months 
later on 24 February 2014, purporting to show the Prime Minister and his son conspiring to secrete 
                                                          
12 “323.Nağme: Taksim Gezi Parkı Hadiseleri ve Problemlerin Temeli”, Herkul (6 June 2013). At  
http://www.herkul.org/herkul-nagme/323-nagme-taksim-gezi-parki-hadiseleri-ve-problemlerin-temeli/ 
(Accessed 13 April 2019). 
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away huge sums of money, were their strongest blow. The veracity of the recordings was never clearly 
established, although many, including opposition politicians, believed that they were genuine (Nakhoul 
and Tattersall 2014). What is certain, however, is that the Gülenists obtained them through illegal means 
by the sustained wire-tapping of encrypted government telephone lines, and their intention was clearly 
to fatally destabalize Erdoğan’s government. Nevertheless, while Erdoğan suffered some losses, he and 
his party still secured a majority in both local and presidential elections the following year: the 
Gülenists’ plot had failed.  
 
The Coup Attempt of 15 July 2016 and its Aftermath 
Two and a half years later, amidst on-going hostilities between Erdoğan and the GM, the country was 
shaken to the core by a military coup attempt. A bloody and chaotic night saw aircraft from a rebel 
faction within the armed forces attack, amongst other targets, the Turkish intelligence headquarters and 
the parliament in Ankara, and an embattled President Erdoğan addressing the nation via the ‘Facetime’ 
app on his mobile phone, inviting his supporters to come out onto the streets to resist the military 
takeover – something which hundreds of them duly did (Nakhoul and Tattersall 2014). The frenzied 
scenes of pro-government civilians overrunning military tanks on the Bosphorus Bridge (since renamed 
15 Temmuz Şehitler Köprüsü – 15 July Martyrs’ Bridge) became emblematic of the night, and the 
triumph of Erdoğan over the coup plotters.   
Erdoğan made it clear immediately, during this address in the early hours of the morning and at the 
height of the crisis, that he held Fethullah Gülen and his followers to blame for the coup attempt, and 
for attempting to violently dismantle Turkey’s democratic tradition. Over the course of the night, the 
government and its supporters repudiated the coup and regained control, but not without the loss of 
almost 300 lives. Subsequently, close to 150,000 individuals were either arrested or suspended from 
their duties across an extremely wide section of Turkish civil society, and a state of emergency was 
instigated, which was to continue for two years, until July 2018. Turkey continues to formally request 
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the extradition of Gülen by the US authorities amid suggestions that the death penalty could be re-
introduced as punishment for the plotters. To date, this extradition request has not been granted.  
The coup attempt signalled a catastrophic end for the GM in Turkey as well as a catalyst for Erdoğan 
to consolidate his power, capitalising on a paranoid narrative that posits the president as defender of the 
nation in the face of threats to its security from within and without. Following a public referendum in 
2017, Turkey will change from a parliamentary to presidential system with Erdoğan at the helm. The 
separation of powers has been almost entirely eroded, and executive power henceforth resides 
exclusively in the person of the president. Deteriorations in the economy in recent years have impacted 
somewhat on Erdoğan’s popularity, a fact that was reflected in the local elections of April 2019, in 
which the opposition unexpectedly took control of the Ankara as well as Istanbul municipalities for the 
first time in over 25 years.13 While this turn away from the AK Party at a local level in Turkey’s two 
major cities is significant, general elections are not scheduled until 2023 and it is unlikely that anything 
will loosen Erdoğan’s grip on power at a national level in the near future. The ramifications for the GM 
are severe: the government continues to seek out Gülenist sympathisers in Turkey, real or imagined, 
and to mete out punishment on them.  
 
Conclusion 
The GM is now tasked with counting its considerable losses, adapting to its position in exile, and forging 
a new future for itself in the face of extreme hostility from the Turkish government. It has lost a 
considerable amount of financial wealth through the confiscations of the Turkish state since 2016, and 
there have been far fewer instances of the lavishly funded public engagement activities that once 
characterized the global GM.14 Many followers of Gülen are imprisoned in Turkey, and those who 
managed to flee the country are dependent on on-going asylum applications elsewhere. In the midst of 
                                                          
13 At the time of writing (April 2019), the outcome of the Istanbul ballot was being contested by the 
government. 
14 For example, the GM funded and organized a number of large conferences in the UK and US in the first 
decade of this century, all of which were heavily subsidized and generously catered for. At a local level as well, 
spending seems to be diminished (Tee 2018). 
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these seismic changes, the internal integrity of the movement has suffered a blow: for the first time, 
GM insiders have spoken out critically about Fethullah Gülen and his leadership. Such criticisms had 
previously only been voiced by those who had left the GM, and they are indication of the potential for 
damaging internal divisions that could change the future course of the movement.   
In sum, the post-coup GM is in many ways a fractured and diminished organization. Yet at the same 
time, entirely typically of the movement, it appears to be adapting to these new circumstances and 
finding a way to capitalize on them. Adaptation to local circumstance and opportunity is one of the 
hallmarks of the GM. While the core activities of the movement have been the same in every location 
that it has been present in, the movement has nonetheless always endeavored to engage with the 
particular strategic opportunities of each place (Tee 2016: 119-139). In the West, and in the USA 
especially, the strategic focus of the GM has always been public relations. It has run schools as well,15 
but an equally important focus of its activities in the US and UK has been the establishment of debating 
and public engagement organizations such as Rumi Forum in Washington DC and the Dialogue Society 
in London. In the post-coup era, its investment in building up a credible presence for itself in Western 
nations as a Muslim voice of dialogue and moderation is paying dividends. The GM retains a lobbying 
presence in DC and London, as well as in Brussels, and its fight back against President Erdoğan is 
taking place partly through English-language publications of its PR organizations.16 Erdoğan has 
already lost almost all the international political support that he commanded in the first two terms of his 
office as PM, and is now regarded by western governments as a volatile and dangerous ‘strongman’ 
leader. The GM’s ability to communicate in excellent English and to circulate its self-representative 
accounts of the war with Erdoğan in the centers of western political power is very clearly advantageous.  
                                                          
15 In the UK, the GM has only ever had one school, North London Grammar school in Hendon (established 
2014), previously Wisdom School in Haringey (established 2006). Elsewhere in the West, and especially in the 
US where the charter school system suits its ends, the GM’s schools have been greater in number.  
16 See, for example, the publications of the Centre for Hizmet Studies, particularly an article by Özcan Keleş of 
London’s Dialogue Society, published two months after the coup (Keleş 2016). The article is a compelling but 
blinkered defense of Gülen and the GM. The GM’s publishing houses in the US continue to produce 
hagiographic materials on Gülen, including most recently Jon Pahl’s Fethullah Gülen: A Life of Hizmet (New 
Jersey: Blue Dome, 2019). 
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 The academic literature since 2016 has of course focused on the coup and its aftermath. The field has 
moved on rapidly in that time, and there is now a body of critical literature that is making inroads into 
analyzing the GM through sociological, anthropological and political science lenses. This literature is 
well aware of the GM’s complexities, and shows none of the ‘enchanted’ tone of some of the work that 
came before. Simon Watmough and Ahmet Erdi Öztürk’s article of 2018, which prefaced a special 
journal issue on the GM in post-coup exile, is an incisive and empirically informed analysis of the GM 
that focuses on its pursuit of power. This analytical approach is shared by Hakan Yavuz and Bayram 
Balcı, two long-time scholars of the GM, whose edited collection of 2018 analyses the movement’s 
involvement in the coup and its aftermath. A broad scholarly consensus is emerging which sees the GM 
neither as the pacifist, dialogical voice for modern Islam that it presents itself as in the West, not as the 
shari’a-minded terrorist or revolutionary movement that many see it as in Turkey, but rather as an 
organization inspired by religion but in pursuit of worldly power, wealth and influence. The next chapter 
of the GM’s life has yet to be written, but it is highly likely that its voracious appetite for such power, 
along with its successful negotiation of an amenable, post-9/11 political landscape in the West, will 
mean that, in spite of Erdoğan’s best efforts, we are far from seeing the end of it yet.    
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